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INTRODUCTION 
In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt,1 the Supreme Court 
considers whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall,2 a 1979 Supreme Court 
decision. Hall permitted a State to be haled into the court of another 
State without its consent. In 2016, an evenly divided Supreme Court 
affirmed Hall 4-4 when faced with the same question, and following a 
remand to the Nevada Supreme Court, the Court has granted 
certiorari on this question once again. 
This Commentary contends that Hall was wrongly decided and 
should be overruled. The Constitution’s ratification did not alter the 
status of common-law State sovereign immunity, leaving intact not 
only State sovereign immunity in a State’s own court but also a State’s 
immunity to suits in the courts of another State without consent. 
However, this case, in which the Petitioner has already appeared in 
the court of another State, is not the appropriate vehicle for 
overruling Hall. State sovereign immunity should be restored at the 
next possible opportunity, when the issue is properly brought before 
the Court. 
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  1.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717 (Nev. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 
2710 (argued Jan. 9, 2019) (No. 17-1299). 
  2.  440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
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I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1993, an auditor for the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB), 
petitioner in this case, read a newspaper article discussing the 
considerable patent income of respondent and inventor Gilbert 
Hyatt.3 Reviewing Hyatt’s 1991 return, the auditor found that Hyatt 
claimed to have lived in California during the first nine months of 
1991 before moving to Nevada, where he spent the remainder of that 
year.4 However, the absence of any claimed moving expenses on 
Hyatt’s 1991 return caused the FTB to audit Hyatt’s 1991 state 
income tax return.5 The audit included more than one hundred letters 
and demands for information sent to various individuals and entities, 
a request for information and documents from the respondent 
directly, interviews with Hyatt’s relatives, and auditor trips to both 
Hyatt’s former California neighborhood and Las Vegas, Nevada.6 
Although the FTB determined that Hyatt had rented a Nevada 
apartment, obtained a Nevada driver’s license, insurance policy, and 
bank account, and also registered to vote, the FTB found that Hyatt 
had not actually moved to Nevada from California until April 1992.7 
The FTB believed that Hyatt developed this elaborate scheme to 
avoid California state income tax liability on his patent-licensing 
income.8 It assessed $4.5 million in taxes, penalties and interest against 
Hyatt for the 1991 tax year,9 as well as $6 million in taxes and interest 
for not filing a California return in 1992.10 Hyatt filed protests with the 
FTB that would last over a decade.11 
While the protests were in progress, Hyatt filed suit against the 
FTB in Nevada in 1998 for, inter alia, invasion of privacy, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, fraud, breach of confidential 
relationship, and negligence.12 Acknowledging, however, that Nevada 
v. Hall established that a State court can assert jurisdiction over 
another State without that State’s consent,13 California filed two 
 
 3.  Hyatt, 407 P.3d at 725 (Nev. 2017).  
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. at 726.  
 8.  See id. (“FTB further concluded that Hyatt had staged the earlier move to Nevada . . . 
in an effort to avoid state income tax liability on his patent licensing.”).  
 9.  Id.  
   10.  Id. 
   11.  Id. 
   12.  Id. at 724. 
   13.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1280 (2016). 
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petitions seeking immunity from the Nevada lawsuit on other 
grounds, “arguing that it was entitled to the complete immunity that it 
enjoyed under California law based on either sovereign immunity, the 
full faith and credit clause, or comity.”14 The Nevada Supreme Court 
found that even though these principles did not entitle the FTB to full 
immunity, the FTB should receive partial immunity to the same 
extent that a Nevada government agency would have received.15 This 
partial immunity shielded the FTB from the negligence claim but did 
not cover the suit’s intentional tort claims.16 
In 2003, the Nevada Supreme Court’s petition rulings granting the 
FTB partial immunity were upheld by the United States Supreme 
Court.17 At trial, a Nevada jury awarded Hyatt more than $380 million 
in damages for emotional distress, invasion of privacy, fraud, and 
punitive damages.18 The Nevada Supreme Court on appeal reduced 
the FTB’s compensatory damages liability to roughly $1 million19 and 
affirmed the judgment for fraud.20 The court declined to apply a 
Nevada statutory damages cap for state officials and upheld Hyatt’s 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim while 
reversing the IIED damage award.21 The court also reversed the 
punitive damage award, affording the FTB the same protection from 
punitive damages afforded Nevada government entities.22 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether Nevada 
v. Hall should be overruled and determine if the Nevada Supreme 
Court erroneously failed to apply Nevada agency statutory 
immunities to the Franchise Tax Board.23 The Court affirmed 
Nevada’s exercise of jurisdiction over a California state agency 4-4 
 
   14.  See id. at 727. The Nevada Supreme Court has defined comity as “a legal principle 
whereby a forum state may give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state based 
in part on deference and respect for the other state, but only so long as the other state’s laws are 
not contrary to the policies of the forum state.”). Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 
717, 729. 
   15.  Id. 
   16.  Id. 
   17.  Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003)). 
  18.  Id. at 728. 
   19.  See Brief for Respondent at 7, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717 (Nev. 
2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (Nov. 15, 2018) (No. 17-1299) [hereinafter Brief for 
Respondent] (“[The Nevada Supreme Court] reduced the Board’s liability for compensatory 
damages to $1 million on Hyatt’s fraud claim and remanded the case for a retrial on damages 
with respect to Hyatt’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.”). 
   20.  Id. 
   21.  Id. at 8–9. 
   22.  Id. at 9. 
   23.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1280 (2016). 
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and found that the Full Faith and Credit Clause24 barred Nevada from 
awarding damages against a California agency greater than could be 
awarded against a Nevada agency in similar circumstances under 
Nevada law.25 
On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court directed the trial court to 
apply the Nevada government agency statutory damage cap of 
$50,000 to the FTB.26 Finally, two years after its 4-4 affirmance of 
Nevada v. Hall, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the same 
question in June 2018.27 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The question of a State’s sovereign immunity in the courts of its 
fellow States of the union is currently governed by Nevada v. Hall, a 
1979 decision affirmed 4-4 by the Supreme Court in 2016.28 In Hall, a 
University of Nevada employee collided with a vehicle containing 
California residents on a California highway.29 The injured California 
residents sued, inter alia, the State of Nevada in California court.30 On 
appeal, the California Supreme Court found California law to permit 
suit of the State of Nevada in California court.31 After a California 
jury awarded the California residents over $1 million in damages and 
the California Supreme Court declined review,32 the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari33 to address for the first time “whether a State may 
claim immunity from suit in the courts of another State.”34 The Court 
determined there was no such immunity.35 
Nevada did not contend that the California Supreme Court had 
incorrectly interpreted California law.36 Instead, Nevada argued that 
the Constitution implicitly required States to abide by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity at the time of the Constitution’s ratification.37 The 
 
   24.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1. 
   25.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. at 1280. 
   26.  Brief for Petitioner at 10, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717 (Nev. 2017), 
cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (Sept. 11, 2018) (No. 17-1299) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
   27.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 138 S. Ct. 2710. 
   28.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. at 1280. 
   29.  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979). 
   30.  Id. at 411–12. 
   31.  Id. 
   32.  Id. at 413. 
   33.  Nevada v. Hall, 436 U.S. 925. 
   34.  440 U.S. at 414. 
  35.  See id. at 426. 
  36.  Id. at 418. 
  37.  Id.  
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idea that a sovereign could not be sued without consenting, Nevada 
claimed, was commonly understood.38 In deciding Hall, the Court 
examined both the “source and scope” of sovereign immunity 
doctrine, the doctrine’s impact on the Constitution, the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, and constitutional limitations of sovereignty.39 
A. The Sovereign Immunity Doctrine 
The sovereign immunity doctrine combines two concepts, “one 
applicable to suits in the sovereign’s own courts and the other to suits 
in the courts of another sovereign.”40 The former, originating from the 
feudal system, has stood for centuries.41 Once the American colonies 
successfully rebelled against the king of England, they became 
sovereigns, thus inheriting sovereign immunity.42 Though United 
States law has not maintained the British “fiction that the King could 
do no wrong,” it has maintained the concept “that immunity from suit 
is an attribute of sovereignty.”43 The latter concept, immunity in the 
courts of another sovereign, is less clear. 
The Constitution’s drafters did not discuss whether comity would 
shield a State from being haled into the court of a fellow State 
without consent.44 Although this may have been because the Framers 
assumed that comity would prevent the States from attempting to 
hale one another into court,45 that assumption has not proven true. 
Instead, the States were “vitally interested” in potential liability in the 
new federal courts.46 Thus, the Supreme Court’s 1793 finding in 
Chisholm v. Georgia47 that States could be sued in federal court 
swiftly led to the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, limiting 
federal court power to hear suits against the States.48 Yet the Eleventh 
 
  38.  Id. at 414. 
  39.  Id. 
  40.  Id. 
  41.  Id. 
  42.  Brief of Indiana and 43 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (Sept. 18, 2018) (No. 17-1299), 2018 WL 
4583704 at *3 [hereinafter Brief of Indiana]. 
  43.  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 421–22. 
   44.  Id. at 419. 
   45.  Id. 
   46.  Id. at 418. 
   47.  See 2 U.S. 419, 452 (1793) (“[I]f sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other 
than the sovereign’s own Courts, it follows that when a State, by adopting the Constitution, has 
agreed to be amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given 
up her right of sovereignty.”). 
   48.  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 420. 
DILL_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2019  2:45 PM 
134 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
Amendment does not grant the federal judiciary the power to enforce 
interstate comity.49 
B. The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause “require[s] each State to give 
effect to official acts of other States.”50 It sometimes requires one 
State’s court to apply another State’s statutory law, but not where 
doing so would violate the former’s “own legitimate public policy.”51 
The Hall court found that denying California jurisdiction “would be 
obnoxious to [California’s] statutorily based policies of jurisdiction 
over nonresident motorists and full recovery,” declining to interpret 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause as requiring such a verdict.52 
C. Constitutional Limitations on Sovereignty 
Relying on the inability of the States of the Union to tax each 
other’s goods, bar entry from one another and deny extradition, as 
well as the entitlement of each State’s citizens to the privileges and 
immunities of the other States, the Hall Court reasoned that the 
United States “is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns.”53 
And while the Court noted its past presumption of States’ comity 
toward one another, it recognized that a State’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over another State clearly contradicted that 
presumption.”54 
*** 
Acknowledging the potential wisdom of a system in which States 
give each other immunity, the Hall Court declined to infer such a 
requirement from the Constitution.55 In fact, the Court held that 
denying California the ability to enforce its own policy would be the 
true intrusion on State sovereignty. 
 
   49.  Id. at 421. 
  50.  Id. 
   51.  Id. at 421–22. 
   52.  Id. at 424. 
   53.  Id. at 425. 
   54.  Id. at 425–26. 
   55.  Id. 
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III. HOLDING 
The Supreme Court’s 4-4 affirmation of Nevada v. Hall’s State 
sovereign immunity precedent prevented the Supreme Court of 
Nevada from having to directly reconsider this possible bar to 
California liability in Nevada court. On remand of Franchise Tax 
Board of California v. Hyatt, the Supreme Court of Nevada referred 
to Nevada v. Hall’s holding that a State “can open the doors of its 
courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against another State . . . without 
the other State’s consent.”56 Observing that Nevada would “consider” 
providing immunity to States brought into Nevada court, the Court 
commented that Nevada was not required to do so.57 
With Hall’s precedent still firmly in place, the Nevada court 
instead addressed more narrow questions of State sovereign 
immunity. Examination of these questions would have been obviated 
had the Supreme Court overruled Hall. Similarly, the Nevada 
Supreme Court’s 2014 Hyatt opinion (preceding the Supreme Court’s 
4-4 Hall affirmation) examined the narrower issue of whether Nevada 
should extend its statutory discretionary function immunity to 
California.58 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
The FTB contends that Hall was wrongly decided for two 
reasons.59 It first argues that since Hall, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that the Hall majority was wrong to seek 
Constitutional support for interstate sovereign immunity.60 Rather, 
the Court should have examined whether States were immune to suits 
in the courts of other States of the Union prior to the Constitution’s 
ratification.61 Petitioner relies on Alden v. Maine62 in asserting that 
“States continue to enjoy the immunity they possessed before the 
 
   56.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717, 724 (Nev. 2017) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1279–80) (2016). 
   57.  Id. at 729. 
   58.  See generally Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125 (Nev. 2014). 
   59.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 10. 
   60.  Id. 
   61.  Id. at 10–11. 
   62.  527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). 
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ratification of the Constitution, unless the Constitution abrogated that 
immunity.”63 
Petitioner asserts that the historical record clearly shows that 
States enjoyed immunity from one another’s courts prior to the 
Constitution’s ratification, and the Framers did not intend to abrogate 
that immunity.64 The outcry over Chisholm’s allowance of suits against 
States in federal courts leads to the logical conclusion that States also 
assumed they could not be sued by one another, as the prospect of 
trial in a neutral setting would have been far less threatening in 
comparison.65 
Petitioner argues that The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon,66 an 1812 
case holding “[the fact] that a forum nation may choose whether to 
recognize another nation’s sovereign immunity in its courts—says 
nothing about whether States in a federal union are required to 
recognize each other’s sovereign immunity in their courts,” highlights 
the absence of a governing authority capable of forcing nations to 
provide each other sovereign immunity.67 This is not the case 
regarding disputes between member States of the United States, 
Petitioner contends, as the Constitution endowed the Supreme Court 
with the power to force members of the United States to respect one 
another’s sovereign immunity.68 
Second, Petitioner argues that Hall “gave little consideration to 
the constitutional values that are protected by sovereign immunity.”69 
These include States’ dignitary interests and State citizens’ interests in 
self-government.70 Petitioner points to the present case, still in 
litigation more than twenty years after its 1998 filing71 and one in 
which a Nevada court has intruded on “California’s conduct of one of 
 
   63.  Id. at 17. 
   64.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 11 (“The historical record shows beyond 
doubt that the States did enjoy immunity in each other’s courts in the pre-ratification era and 
that the Framers had no intention of abrogating that immunity.”). 
   65.  See id. (“That understanding was confirmed by the outraged reaction to this Court’s 
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, allowing States to be sued in the neutral federal courts—a 
reaction that would have made little sense had anyone thought States could be sued in the 
potentially more hostile courts of other States.”) (citation omitted). 
   66.  11 U.S. 116 (1812). 
   67.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 11. 
   68.  Id. at 11–12. 
   69.  Id. at 12. 
   70.  Id. 
   71.  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 407 P.3d 717, 726 (Nev. 2017). 
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its core sovereign functions,” as a prime example of Hall’s abuse of 
these values.72 
Petitioner also argues that there are multiple reasons why stare 
decisis should not control here.73 First, Hall is not in line with multiple 
post-Hall Supreme Court State sovereign immunity holdings.74 
Petitioner points to the Court’s statement in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, which advocates the overturn of precedent that has been left 
“a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.”75 In 1993 the 
Court stated that Eleventh Amendment “accords the States the 
respect owed them as members of the federation,”76 and in 1997 the 
Court observed that sovereign immunity protects “the dignity and 
respect afforded a State.”77 Therefore, petitioner believes Hall to be 
such a “mere survivor.”78 
Hall was an outlier even in 1979, permitting States to be haled into 
each other’s courts without consent despite their immunity in their 
own courts and in federal court.79 Since Hall, the Court has expanded, 
rather than contracted, State sovereign immunity, while at the same 
time leaving States vulnerable to court systems more likely to be 
hostile: those of other States.80 Thus, Petitioner contends, overruling 
Hall will not threaten other precedents.81 
Petitioner’s second argument against stare decisis is that Hall has 
not led to reliance by subsequent parties.82 As, practically speaking, 
only the Supreme Court can overturn Constitutional precedent,83 
 
   72.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 12 (“This suit—in which a California state 
agency has been subjected to astonishing burdens for two decades, and in which a Nevada judge 
and jury have passed judgment on California’s conduct of one of its core sovereign functions—
exemplifies why Hall cannot be squared with the values the Court has recognized in later 
decisions.”). 
   73.  Id. 
   74.  See id. (“Hall is a poorly reasoned decision that is inconsistent with this Court’s 
subsequent precedents in numerous respects.”). 
   75.  Id. at 40 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992)). 
   76.  P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). 
   77.  Idaho v. Couer d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997). 
   78.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 40 (“Hall is also inconsistent with the Court’s 
recognition in more recent decisions of the values underlying the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.”). 
   79.  Id. at 40–41. 
   80.  Id.  
   81.  Id. at 43. 
   82.  Id.  
   83.  See id. (“In such cases, only the Court can correct the error of a prior decision, because 
‘correction through legislative action is practically impossible.”) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 
501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). 
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stare decisis is weakest when considering the Court’s Constitutional 
interpretation.84 Here, no parties have taken specific action assuming 
that Hall’s precedent will stand,85 lessening the potential impact of 
overturning it. 
Finally, Petitioner points to Hall’s harms, using the present case as 
an example.86 Sovereign immunity should protect the dignity of States, 
particularly regarding taxation.87 Yet here, ten years of litigation 
resulted in a State jury awarding a fellow State resident $388 million 
in damages at the expense of the taxpayers of another State.88 Any 
damage assessed against a State directly diminishes State spending 
that would benefit its taxpayers.89 Hyatt has also done the State of 
California the indignity of having its conduct reviewed not just by the 
judiciary of another State, but by a jury of that State’s citizens.90 
Petitioner also points to the fact that this suit is not even the only one 
of its type, as California now faces suit in the State of Washington as 
well.91 In fact, even Nevada, the very State that exercised jurisdiction 
over Petitioner, now seeks for Hall to be overruled.92 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent argues that certiorari should be dismissed for two 
reasons. First, Respondent contends that case doctrine controls.93 The 
evenly divided Court affirmation of Hall when the question was first 
presented constitutes a judgment on the merits.94 Conceding that an 
evenly divided court has no precedential value, Respondent says that 
it is nonetheless binding on the parties here.95 
 
   84.  Id. 
   85.  See id. at 43–44 (“Here, by contrast, no parties ‘have acted in conformance with 
existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions,’ or have otherwise conducted their lives in a 
manner that assumes the continuing vitality of a constitutional precedent.”) (quoting Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010)) (citation omitted) 
   86.  Id. at 44. 
   87.  Id. at 45. 
   88.  Id. at 44. 
   89.  See id. at 45 (“Such damages awards necessarily crowd out ‘other important needs and 
worthwhile ends’ that California’s public fisc must fund.”) (quoting Alden v. Maine., 527 U.S. 
706, 751 (1999)). 
   90.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 45. 
   91.  Id. 
   92.  See Brief of Indiana, supra note 43 (listing Nevada as one of the Filing Parties). 
   93.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 12. 
   94.  Id. at 13. 
   95.  Id. at 18. 
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Chief Justice John Marshall upheld this principle in Etting v. 
United States,96 and it appeared again in Durant v. Essex Co.,97 in 
which Durant sought a rehearing after the Supreme Court’s tie vote 
affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling.98 The Court held that, where a 
court is equally divided on a question of whether to “set aside or 
modify an existing judgment or order, the division operates as a denial 
of the application, and the judgment, or order, stands in full 
force . . . .”99 Respondent also points to Hertz v. Woodman100 and Neil 
v. Biggers101 as affirming this principle.102 
The law of case doctrine—that a court’s ruling in a case governs 
that case’s subsequent stages—allows parties to rely on a court’s 
ruling.103 Here, the Nevada Supreme Court has relied on the Supreme 
Court’s prior affirmation of Hall in finding that the FTB could indeed 
be haled into Nevada court.104 Hyatt himself has relied on the Court’s 
prior decisions in this case, which has cost both parties “an enormous 
amount of time and money.”105 Overruling Hall would be particularly 
unjust, Respondent argues, given that Petitioner chose not to 
challenge Hall in the initial litigation.106 Departing from case doctrine 
should be done sparingly, such as where the initial decision was clearly 
erroneous.107 Here, Hall is certainly not clearly erroneous.108 
Second, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s failure to initially 
raise this question constituted a waiver of its right to do so.109 
Respondent highlights that the FTB did not argue that Hall should be 
overruled when this case first reached the Supreme Court.110 
Petitioner only raised this question following the Nevada Supreme 
Court’s affirmance of “key aspects of liability and damages” on 
remand.111 According to Respondent, “[t]he law is clear that if an 
 
   96.  24 U.S. 59, 78 (1826). 
   97.  74 U.S. 107 (1869). 
   98.  Id. at 109 (1869). 
  99.  Id. at 110. 
 100.  218 U.S. 205 (1910). 
 101.  409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
 102.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 20. 
 103.  Id. at 21. 
 104.  Id. at 21–22. 
 105.  Id. at 24. 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id. (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)). 
 108.  Id. at 24. 
 109.  Id. at 13–14. 
 110.  Id. at 11. 
 111.  Id. at 12. 
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argument is not raised in a petition for certiorari, it is deemed 
waived.”112 Even State sovereign immunity can be waived.113 
Respondent next lists several reasons to affirm Hall, first noting 
the presumption against overruling precedent.114 As the Court 
observed in 2006, stare decisis “avoids the instability and unfairness 
that accompany disruption of settled legal expectations.”115 The Court 
should only depart from stare decisis when there is a “compelling 
justification,”116 which the FTB has failed to present here. 
Second, Respondent states that Hall protects the States’ Tenth 
Amendment power to protect their citizens.117 A State’s desire to 
provide a remedy for its injured citizens is legitimate.118 Here, a 
Nevada jury clearly found the FTB’s conduct against Hyatt 
outrageous, as it awarded nearly $400 million in damages.119 Although 
Petitioner speaks of the dignity interest of States, it argues for the 
indignity of prohibiting States from protecting their own citizens.120 
No State is as interested as Nevada in protecting Nevada citizens. 
Upholding Hall would “affirm[] the dignity and autonomy of a State 
to be able to determine the jurisdiction of its courts . . . .”121 
Hall has not resulted in frequent suits against out-of-state 
defendants, and multiple factors already limit liability where such 
suits occur. Respondents dismiss Petitioner’s claimed “harms” of Hall 
as “a relative handful of suits.”122 It was rare for States to be sued in 
the court of another State pre-Hall and remains rare today.123 
Furthermore, Respondent argues that Petitioner has made no showing 
that the few suits that have occurred lacked merit.124 And even when 
 
 112.  Id. at 26 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 n.13 (1996); Tenn. Student 
Ass’n Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 456 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
 113.  Id. at 27 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 18 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)). 
 114.  Id. at 28. 
 115.  Id. (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006)). 
 116.  Id. at 29 (quoting Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 30 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 64 (1971) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See id. (“The Board speaks of the ‘dignity’ interest of states in not being sued . . . but 
fails to recognize the dignity interest of a state in being able as a sovereign to determine the 
jurisdiction of its own courts and to protect its own citizens from harm.”) (citing Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 26, at 38). 
 121.  Id. at 32. 
 122.  Id. at 33. 
 123.  Id. at 33. 
 124.  Id. at 49. 
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such suits occur, the Full Faith and Credit Clause limits liability to the 
amount permitted against the forum State by its own laws.125 
Although not required, comity may also play a role. Here, the Nevada 
Supreme Court recognized comity in prohibiting punitive damages 
against the out-of-state Petitioner.126 And finally, States desiring to not 
be vulnerable to suits in one another’s courts are not prohibited from 
freely entering into mutual immunity agreements.127 
Third, no new historical evidence has been uncovered post-Hall 
indicating that the Hall court was wrong. Facing similar facts, the Hall 
court found no historical support for State immunity in the court of 
another sovereign, relying on Schooner v. McFaddon in holding that 
sovereign immunity was not meant to extend so far.128 In the absence 
of such a special justification, Hall should stand.129 As Schooner 
Exchange “established the power of a state . . . to provide a remedy to 
its injured citizens against out-of-staters,” the Court was correct to 
rely on it despite Petitioner’s objections that Schooner Exchange dealt 
not with State immunity but that of nations.130 
The Court correctly based Hall on three premises: the pre-
Constitution States were independent sovereigns immune in each 
other’s courts, sovereign nations were only immune in the courts of 
another nation with the consent of that nation, and the Constitution 
did not disturb that balance. Respondent cites the amicus brief of 
Professors Baude and Sachs, arguing that “[t]he Constitution left 
sister-state immunity alone.”131 Respondent also cites Petitioner’s 
brief, which states that “[n]o State could be required to respect 
another’s sovereign immunity” prior to the Constitution’s 
ratification.132 Petitioner’s reliance on Alden v. Maine in promulgating 
State sovereign immunity is an improperly broad extension.133 Alden 
v. Maine shows that States may elect to be immune in their own 
 
 125.  Id. at 34 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1281 (2016)). 
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Id. at 35 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979)).  
 128.  Id. at 37–38. 
 129.  See id. at 36 (arguing that Nevada v. Hall was decided on the original understanding 
and a careful analysis of historical precedent). 
  130.  Id. at 38–39. 
  131.  Id. at 40 (citing Brief of Professors William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 6, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 138 S. Ct. 2710 
(Sept. 18, 2018) (No. 17-1299), 2018 WL 4583702 at *6 [hereinafter Sachs Brief]). 
  132.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 31–32. 
  133.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 46. 
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courts, and Nevada v. Hall adds that States may elect to permit suit of 
other States in their own courts.134 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Sister-state Sovereign Immunity, provided for in the common law, 
was left unaltered by the Constitution 
Prior to ratifying the Constitution, the States were sovereigns in 
every respect, and could not be forced into the courts of one another 
absent consent. The States today should retain sovereign immunity 
within their own courts. Petitioner asserts that States today have the 
same degree of sovereign immunity as they did pre-Constitutional 
ratification,135 and surprisingly the Respondent concedes that the 
Constitution “left sister-state immunity alone.”136 The States’ amici 
brief cites Alexander Hamilton’s observation: “‘there is no colour to 
pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of [the 
Constitution], be divested’ of their immunity.”137 Therefore, assuming 
the Constitution did indeed leave sister-state immunity untouched, 
States today should enjoy immunity in one another’s courts to the 
same extent that they did prior to joining the Union. The pre-
Constitution status of inter-state immunity must therefore be 
dispositive. 
Professors Baude and Sachs believe that Hall was correct in 
finding no constitutional sister-state immunity.138 A guarantee of 
sister-state immunity is not found in the Constitution’s plain 
language.139 But States retain every power “not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States.”140 The federal government is not empowered to abrogate 
sister-state immunity, which still exists in the common law today as it 
did prior to the Constitution. 
 
  134.  Id. at 44. 
  135.  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 10. 
  136.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 40 (quoting Sachs Brief, supra note 131, at 
6) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  137.  Brief of Indiana, supra note 43, at 5 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
  138.  Sachs Brief, supra note 131, at 2. 
  139.  Id. 
  140.  Id. at 3 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X). 
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B. When States choose to allow suit of another State without that 
State’s consent, any judgment rendered is unenforceable 
As a common-law provision, States are powerless to force other 
States to recognize their immunity.141 California cannot control which 
suits Nevada decides to bring in Nevada court. California could, of 
course, consent to be sued in Nevada, but if Nevada decides to 
proceed without that consent, California is powerless to prevent it 
from doing so. But a Nevada court’s judgment against California may 
be unenforceable absent the respect of a federal court.142 Similarly, if 
the United States were to depart from international law in its 
assertion of jurisdiction, there would be no guarantee that foreign 
nations would recognize a resulting judgment.143 This existing 
protection of sister-state immunity may be the reason that the 
Constitution did not address the issue.144 
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires States to 
recognize judgments of other State courts, the Hall Court’s invocation 
of the clause was limited to judgments “issued with ‘jurisdiction over 
the parties.’”145 Were the Court to uphold sister-state sovereign 
immunity, the Full Faith and Credit Clause would be inapplicable. 
Courts today decline to recognize State court judgments where the 
court in question lacked the power to render it.146 
C. Due to Respondent’s voluntary appearance, Hall should be 
overturned at the next opportunity 
Respondent had multiple alternative courses of action available to 
it in this proceeding. It could have stood its ground and refused to 
appear in Nevada court. Had Nevada proceeded to render a judgment 
 
  141.  See id. at 16 (“Because sovereign immunity is a rule of common law and the law of 
nations, a State can abrogate it within its own courts, just as it can abrogate the common-law 
rules of coverture, burglary, or respondeat superior.”). 
  142.  See id. (“As nearly a century of history suggests, the original Constitution did not force 
state or federal courts to respect the judgment of a court which lacked power over the defendant 
under traditional jurisdictional principles. Sister-state immunity was just such a principle. Thus, 
a State which tries to abrogate that immunity may find its judgments without effect in other 
American courts.”). 
  143.  See id. at 18 (“[B]ut if the United States departs from accepted international practice, 
it cannot guarantee that its judgments will continue to be recognized abroad.”). 
  144.  Id. at 17. 
  145.  Id. at 19 (quoting Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979)). 
  146.  Id. at 21 (citing Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 282–83 (1980) (plurality 
opinion); V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1020 (2016); Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 
240–41 (1998)). 
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against the FTB, the FTB could then have chosen to default.147 
Alternatively, Respondent “could have filed an original action against 
Nevada” in the Supreme Court to obtain a declaration of its 
entitlement to immunity in the courts of Nevada.148 As Professors 
Baude and Sachs note, the State of Nevada’s participation in an 
amicus brief asking for Hall to be overruled may indicate that it 
would consent to such an action.149 
However, the Court is confronted with a challenge to Hall in 
which the aggrieved State has already chosen to appear in sister-state 
court. As sister-state immunity consists of an immunity to suit without 
consent of the State haled into court, Respondent appears to have 
submitted to Nevada’s exercise of jurisdiction, failing to avail itself of 
the protection of sister-state immunity. 
Due to the above reasons, the Court should not overrule Hall 
here, but should do so at the earliest appropriate opportunity to 
preserve an aspect of State sovereign immunity that existed before 
the Constitution and was not abrogated by it. In dismissing the writ as 
improvidently granted, the Court should signal similarly situated 
parties that it is prepared to overturn Hall, emboldening States in 
future actions to refuse to appear in a sister-state’s court. California’s 
apparent waiver of its immunity by appearing in Nevada court is 
logical, as it appeared with no expectation that its sovereign immunity 
would be respected in the era of the wrongly decided Hall. Were Hall 
to be overruled a similarly situated Respondent would indeed waive 
its right to suit in the State court of another without its consent by 
appearing at the proceeding. Although dismissing the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted will prolong the period in which 
States are wrongly forced into the courts of peers without their 
consent, that period should be short given the overwhelming number 
of States that joined together in filing an amicus brief in support of 
overruling Hall. This question will surely reach the Court again 
swiftly. 
 
  147.  See id. at 23 (“States have a number of tools for resisting adverse judgments. The most 
obvious strategy is simply to default, as Georgia did in Chisholm, and to resist enforcement later 
on.”) (citation omitted). 
  148.  Id. at 24. 
  149.  Id. 
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D. Stare decisis is not compelling here 
Although Respondent is correct in contending that the current 
volume of cases that offend sister-state sovereign immunity is not 
practically unworkable, that is not the bar that must be met here. It is 
sufficient that a significant State right that endured the first two 
hundred years of United States legal history intact was wrongly taken 
away in 1979. Even a single case forcing a sovereign State into the 
court of a peer is too many. Respondent points to the “almost 40-year-
old precedent” of Hall.150 Yet this period pales in comparison to the 
much longer precedent period during which State sovereign immunity 
was left untouched. Respondent does not see this deprivation of 
States’ rights as a compelling reason for overruling Hall. Respondent 
also fails to explain what instability and unfairness would be caused 
by doing so, while Petitioner has highlighted the lack of reliance 
interests present here. Petitioner has also pointed to the anomalous 
nature of Hall. Hall created a system in which States are immune both 
in their own courts and in federal courts but remain vulnerable in the 
courts most likely to be hostile to them: those of their peers.151 
Overruling Hall will create a more uniform system. 
CONCLUSION 
Franchise Tax Board does not present the ideal set of facts on 
which to overrule Hall, as Respondent appears to have waived its 
immunity by appearing in Nevada court. That does not change the 
fact that Hall wrongly stripped States of an important aspect of State 
sovereign immunity provided in common law and unaltered by the 
Constitution. In doing so, Hall perpetrated an indignity on the United 
States’ member States and changed an aspect of the legal landscape 
that had stood for two centuries. That right should be returned at the 
next opportunity, when a State properly asks a federal court to 
enforce its common-law immunity from the courts of a sister State. 
Sovereigns should enjoy immunity not only in their own courts, but 
also in the courts of their peers. 
 
 
  150.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 28. 
  151.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 26, at 40. 
